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8  Conclusions and Prospects 
8.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, we attempt to explain why Indonesia did not experience a 
debt crisis in 1982-84.  We do so by comparing the Indonesian debt situation 
with  that  of  Mexico and  Brazil,  two  countries which  have  debt-servicing 
difficulties. In  section 8.2 we  examine the most  common explanation for 
external crises which puts the blame on excessive budget deficits that force 
the  government  to borrow  from  abroad.  Section 8.3 identifies the  factors 
which have prevented an Indonesian debt crisis in  1982-84,  and section 8.4 
estimates the  relative importance of  each  factor by  using  Mexico  as the 
reference. In section 8.5 we  discuss the prospects of  Indonesia avoiding a 
future debt crisis and the role for policy in ensuring such an outcome. 
8.2  A Comparative View of Fiscal Imbalances 
When a debt crisis occurs because the government is unable to service the 
external debts that it has guaranteed, it is a truism to claim that government 
budget deficits, i.e., fiscal imbalances, are the root of  all external sovereign 
debt crises. By definition, an external public debt can be incurred only when 
a government borrows from abroad to finance part (or all) of its expenditure. 
In  order  for  fiscal  imbalances  to  have  more  than  a  tautological  role  in 
precipitating an external debt crisis, it is necessary to have a criterion which 
would enable one to assess whether the amount of  foreign borrowing being 
undertaken is excessive in an ex ante sense. 
The statistic usually cited in  support of  this fiscal imbalance view  is the 
ratio of  official long-term debt to GNP, DGNP.'  The official long-term debt 
is  taken  to  represent the  cumulated amount of  fiscal deficits financed by 
external borrowing, and the normalization by GNP is to indicate the extent to 
which the country has been made to live beyond its income by  the budget 
deficits. 
The fiscal  imbalance explanation of  external debt crises points out that 
DGNP rose very rapidly for those countries which experienced a debt crisk2 
From  a  value  of  9.1  percent  in  1970,  Mexico's  DGNP  increased  18.7 
percent in  1981, the eve of  the debt crisis. In the same time period, DGNP 
went up from 8.7 to 19.5 percent for Argentina, from 8.2 to  17 percent for 
Brazil, from  8.1 to  20 percent for the Philippines, and  from 6.6 to  17.2 
percent  for  Venezuela  (see  top  half  of  table  8.1). It  is  true  that  these 
governments increased their budget deficits significantly during this period, 
but it is not true that they have been cumulatively more profligate than the 
countries in the bottom half of  table 8.  I, which did not fall into debt crises. 131  IndonesidChapter 8 
Table 8.1  Public and Publicly-Guaranteed Debt as Fkrcentage of  GNP, DGNP,  1970-85 
1970  1975  1978  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Countries with serious debt problems in  1982-85 
Argentina  8.7  8.2  16.0  19.2  19.5  29.1  42.6'  36.6  58.7 
Brazil  8.2  11.6  14.8  16.6  17.0  18.7  30.3'  34.7  35.5 
Mexico  9.1  13.2  25.3  18.8  18.7  33.3*  50.1  43.4  43.4 
Philippines  8.1  8.8  17.8  18.7  20.0  22.7  31.0'  36.0  41.7 
Venezuela  6.6  4.6  17.4  18.4  17.2  18.3  19.8  36.7*  34.3 
Countries with no serious debt problems in  1982-85 
Indonesia  25.2  25.5  26.6  20.0  17.7  20.5  28.0  26.5  33.4 
Korea  21.2  27.8  22.5  26.9  28.3  29.7  29.8  30.3  35.0 
Malaysia  9.7  14.2  16.9  16.3  23.1  31.4  37.5  38.6  47.8 
Thailand  5.0  4.2  8.0  12.5  14.6  17.2  17.9  18.6  26.4 
Note; Figures for  1978 are from  1985-86  edition of  the World Bank's World Debr  Table, and the rest  are 
from the  1986-87 edition. 
*Year in which debt crisis began. 
In fact, Korea and Malaysia had the highest DGNPs in  1981. There are just 
not enough differences in the 1981 DGNPs of Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia 
to explain why  Indonesia alone avoided a debt crisis in the following two 
years.  The huge jumps  in  the DGNPs of  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  the 
Philippines, and Venezuela occurred only after they were unable to service 
their debts, forcing them to devalue their currencies. 
It must be mentioned that DGNP is a flawed indicator of public profligacy. 
First, the stock of  long-term official debt can understate as well as overstate 
the  amount  of  borrowing  for  budgetary  reasons.  This  is  because  the 
government can borrow short-term to finance budget deficits and long-term 
to  finance  foreign market  interventions.  Second,  DGNP  is  a  measure of 
profligacy only in the sense of living beyond income and not in the sense of 
being unable to service the acquired external debt. An indicator of the latter 
would  normalize  the  external  debt  by  the  level  of  exports,  the  foreign 
exchange earning capacity of  the country. 
To us, the most interesting fact from table 8.1 is how much the DGNP of 
each country soared in the year in which its debt crisis happened. Since the 
big DGNP movement was the result of  a devaluation, this suggests that the 
pre-crisis DGNPs may have been understated and hence provided misleading 
impressions  to  policymakers and  bankers.  This  implies that  inappropriate 
exchange  rate  management  may  have  been  a  very  important  factor  in 
precipitating a country's debt-servicing problem. The currency overvaluation 
not only understated the amount by  which the country had lived beyond its 
means  but,  perhaps  more  importantly,  debilitated  the  export  sector,  the 
foreign exchange generator for the economy. 132  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
8.3  Explaining the Absence of  a 1982-84  Debt Crisis 
As we pointed out in chapter  1, a debt crisis does not occur only when the 
government does not have the reserves to service the loans it has guaranteed. 
A debt crisis also occurs when the government does not have the reserves to 
enable  private  domestic  residents  to  convert  their  service  payments  on 
nonguaranteed  debts  from  domestic to  foreign currency.  When  a  private 
borrower cannot come up with the service payments in domestic currency for 
his private nonguaranteed external debt, we do not consider it a national debt 
crisis  because  the  government  did  not  cause  the  default  except  in  the 
broadest sense of  not creating more favorable macroeconomic  conditions, if 
it were able to do so. 
For the case of  a debt crisis caused by  a shortage of  foreign  reserves to 
allow  conversion  of  private  debt-service  payments,  we  define  the  total 
external debt service to be  the sum of external  short-term debt and the debt 
service  on  all  external  long-term  debt,  publicly-guaranteed  and  private 
nonguaranteed.  We  include short-term debt in our definition because we are 
interested in the financial resilience of a country to sudden protracted credit 
squeezes  in  international  credit  markets which  make short-term borrowing 
extremely expensive, if not occasionally  impossible. After all, the 1973-74 
credit  crunch  did  precipitate  the  1975  Pertamina  debt  crisis,  and  the 
1980-8 1 financial squeeze precipitated the PEMEX crisis of Mexico. 
Since the reserve position of the country is crucial for avoiding debt crises, 
it  is not appropriate to assess the country’s ability to pay by looking  at the 
total  external  debt service  with  respect  to its income. A  more  appropriate 
indicator is the debt-service  ratio-the  debt service normalized by  the level 
of exports-because  the official reserve position is determined primarily  by 
the ability of  the export sector to earn foreign exchange. This point is well 
illustrated  by  parts  (a)  and  (b)  in  table  8.2.  Even  though  the  1980-82 
debt-serviceiGNP  ratios for Brazil and Indonesia are quite close, Brazil had 
an  average  total  DSR  of  over  100 percent  compared  to  the  Indonesian 
average of  30 percent. And Brazil experienced a debt crisis after 1982 and 
Indonesia did not. 
One reason why the Mexican and Brazilian DSRs are so much larger than 
that  of  Indonesia  is  because  Indonesia  is  a  much  more  export-oriented 
economy.  The  average  1980-82  export/GNP  ratio  was  27  percent  for 
Indonesia,  but only  14 percent  for Mexico and 9.5 percent  for Brazil  (see 
memo item in the table). 
Even  if  we  ignore  short-term debt by  assuming (unrealistically)  that  it 
could always be rolled over, we see in part (c) of table 8.2 that the long-term 
DSRs for Mexico and Brazil were still very high compared to Indonesia. The 
1980-82  average was 40 percent for Mexico, 62 percent for Brazil, and  14 
percent for Indonesia. 
Items  (b)  and  (c)  in  table  8.2 together  explain  why  Mexico defaulted 
before Brazil even though their total DSRs were  almost the same in  1981, 133  IndonesidChapter 8 
Table 8.2  Debt Characteristics of Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia, 1978-86 
(in percentages) 
~~ 
1978  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
(a) All short- and long-term debt service as ratio of GNP 
Mexico  12.0  14.1  15.5  24.8  17.4 
Brazil  7.5  11.0  11.6  12.8  13.0 
Indonesia  9.3  7.5  7.3  9.2  10.7 
(b) All short- and long-term debt service as ratio of exports 
Mexico  105.8  103.6  117.1  138.9  80.8 
Brazil  106.5  114.5  113.6  146.0  104.5 
Indonesia  40.8  25.1  26.1  39.0  41.7 
(c) Public and private long-term debt service as ratio of exports 
Mexico  62.4  38.0  35.0  44.6  45.4 
Brazil  57.6  56.4  56.8  71.7  46.2 
Indonesia  25.0  12.7  12.9  16.5  18.4 
(d) Proportion of debt which is short term 
Mexico  14.0  28.3  32.1  30.5  11.1 
Brazil  13.2  19.3  19.2  19.3  14.9 
Indonesia  9.9  13.3  14.4  18.1  15.6 
(e) Proportion of  publicly-guaranteed  long-term debt which has variable rate 
Mexico  59.5  71.5  75.4  76.7  82.7 
Brazil  56.8  61.0  67.1  69.3  70.1 
Indonesia  15.0  16.2  17.8  20.0  22.8 
(f)  Effective interest rate for all long-term debt, calculated by (debt service/debt) 
Mexico  23.4  22.8  20.1  20.8  15.9 
Brazil  18.0  23.3  23.7  23.0  13.9 
Indonesia  17.5  15.5  16.6  16.1  14.6 
Memo item 
Export/GNP ratio 
Mexico  11.3  13.7  13.2  17.9  21.5 
Brazil  7.1  9.6  10.2  8.7  12.4 
Indonesia  22.8  29.7  27.9  23.6  25.8 



































































NA  = not available 
117 percent versus 114 percent. This is because 70 percent of Mexican total 
debt service in  1981 consisted of  rolling over short-term loans, as against 
Brazil’s 50 percent,  and  this  was  the  period  when  the  one-year  London 
interbank offer rate  for dollar deposits (LIBOR) reached  and  remained at 
historic highs. LIBOR was over 10 percent from 1979 to 1984, with a peak 
of  16 percent in 1981 (see item d and the memo item in the table). 
When it was clear in 1980 that short rates would remain high, long rates 
rose too. Since almost 70 percent of Brazilian publicly-guaranteed debt was 
on variable rates, the effective interest rate on Brazilian long-term debt rose 
from 18 percent in  1978 to over 23 percent during the  1980-83  period (see 
items c and  f in table 8.2). The additional interest payments, together with 
the collapse of  its exports due to the deep global recession in 1982, brought 
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Many  authors have cited capital flight as a major cause for the external 
debt crisis in some of  the Latin  American c~untries.~  Part  1 of  table 8.3 
reports  two  sets  of  capital  flight  estimates.  These  estimates  ought  to  be 
treated  with  caution;  different  studies  have  come  up  with  significantly 
different   figure^.^  Sometimes the  sign  is  not  even  certain;  for  example, 
estimates for capital flight from Brazil ranged from  -$0.2 billion to $3.9 
billion. 
The  point  we  want  to make  here  is  that  imprudent maturity  structure 
management  may  have  contributed  more  to  the  Mexican  debt-servicing 
difficulties than capital flight per se. To  see this, we  allow capital flight to 
have maximum impact on the actual DSR  by assuming that Mexico financed 
the capital flight entirely by  short-term debt. Part 2 of table 8.3 shows that 
Mexico’s DSR  in  1982 would have dropped from the actual 138 percent to 
64  percent if  financing had been done with long-term loans instead. Without 
capital flight, the DSR would  have been  45  percent.  In  short,  the  major 
reason why Mexico’s DSR  was so high was because the way in which the 
government financed the capital flight added 74 percentage points. Capital 
flight per se added only 19 percentage points. 
Our conclusion of  imprudence in  the  management of  maturity structure 
can be shown in another way.  To see that much of  the Mexican short-term 
debt was from borrowing by  the government rather than from commercial 
credits to  finance imports,  we  make  use  of  the  fact  that  the  Indonesian 
Table 8.3 
Part  I: Cumulated capital flight amount up to 1982 (in billions of dollars) 
The Role of  Capital Flight in Precipitating Debt Crises 










Part 2: Constructing total debt service/export ratios in 1982 
Actual Ratio  Counterfactual Ratios 
If capital flight had 
been financed by long- 
term instead of  short- 
term loans  No capital Right 
Mexico  138.9  64.2  44.6 
Brazil  146.0  143.2  133.2 
Indonesia  39.0  20.1  16.5 
Note:  Counterfactual ratios were calculated by assuming that capital flight had maximum impact on the actual 
debt-service ratios. This means that capital Rights were assumed to have been financed entirely by short-term 
borrowing. The maximum amount of capital flight was the actual short-term debt of the country. For Mexico 
and  Indonesia,  capital  flights were  assumed  to  equal  actual  short-term debts in  1982; and  for  Brazil  the 
Morgan Guaranty estimate was used. 
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government,  since  the  Pertamina  crisis,  has  avoided  short-term  external 
borrowing  as  much  as  possible.  Assuming  that  the  Indonesian  ratio  of 
short-term debt to imports reflects normal trade financing, we can attribute 
77 percent of  Mexican  short-term debt in  1981 and  1982 to  government 
borrowing. The  1981 and  1982 figures for  Brazil  are 68  percent and  57 
percent, respectively. 
There is a tradeoff in external debt management between generally lower 
interest  payments and  predictability of  debt-service payments.  Short-term 
liabilities pay lower interest rates most of the time, but it is risky to rely on 
a strategy which rolls over large amounts of short-term debt every period. 
An unforeseen credit crunch would force the country to increase borrowing 
in  order to cover its interest payments. If  the credit squeeze persisted for 
more  than  three  years  and  was  accompanied by  a  prolonged  fall  in  the 
country’s exports, this extra borrowing would be difficult to sustain because 
the situation smacks increasingly of  a Ponzi game. 
Capital flight can be  an important mechanism in  bringing about a debt 
crisis, but we cannot view capital flight as an exogenous shock in the Latin 
American debt crises.  Enders and Mattione (1984) and  Dornbusch (1987) 
have emphasized that the large capital flight in Mexico and Argentina was 
the  result  of  highly  overvalued  exchange  rates.  Even  with  overvalued 
exchange rates,  our discussion based  on  table  8.3  concludes that  capital 
flight would  not  have hurt  Mexico’s  debt-service capacity  if  it  had  been 
financed by long-term, rather than short-term, external borrowing. 
Pulling  all  of  the  observations  about  tables  8.2 and  8.3 together,  we 
attribute the absence of an Indonesian debt crisis in 1982-84  to three factors: 
1. A  high  proportion of  Indonesia’s external debt was borrowed at fixed 
concessionary  rates  from  IGGI.  This  ZGGZ  efSect  explains  why  the 
effective interest rate on Indonesian long-run debt averaged  16 percent 
against the 20 percent paid by Mexico and Brazil (part f of  table 8.2). 
Another result  was  that  only  about one-third  of  Indonesian  debt  was 
denominated in dollars compared to 90 percent of Mexican and Brazilian 
debt. This meant that the large appreciation of the dollar from  1979 to 
1982 did not raise the effective interest rate paid by  Indonesia as much as 
it did for that paid by  Mexico and Brazil. 
The  high  degree  of  export  orientation  in  Indonesia  prevented  its 
debt-servicing capacity from collapsing as did Mexico’s when the price 
of  oil  dropped  in  early  1982.  Appropriate exchange  rate  policies  by 
Indonesia, exemplified  by  the  1978 devaluation,  ensured  a  diversified 
export bundle as well as a high export orientation. Indonesia’s political 
concern  to  keep  the  agricultural  sector  vibrant  no  doubt  helped  to 
maintain the observed export orientation. 
The  shock  of  the  1975 Pertamina  crisis  caused  official  borrowing  in 
Indonesia to take place  very  cautiously with regard to exposure in  the 136  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
short-term credit market. The resulting Indonesian prudence is the major 
reason  the  maturity  structure  of  Indonesian  debt  was  so  drastically 
different from that of Mexico. We could also refer to the this factor as the 
Pertamina legacy. 
8.4  The Relative Contribution of Each Factor 
To  get a  sense of  the relative  contribution  of  concessional  IGGI  loans, 
prudence  in  debt  management,  and  export  orientation  in  explaining the 
absence of  an  Indonesian  debt crisis, we decompose the  average  1980-82 
DSR. This is done by comparing  the Indonesian debt situation with that of 
Mexico. We chose Mexico over Brazil because the former is an oil-exporting 
country  like Indonesia.  On  the  eve  of  the  debt  crisis,  oil  was  the  chief 
foreign  exchange earner and  the  biggest  source of  government revenue  in 
both Indonesia and Mexico. 
We  calculate  what  the DSRs would  have  been  if  Indonesia:  (i) paid  the 
same effective interest rates as Mexico; (ii) had managed its debt such that 
its  maturity  structure  was  the  same as  Mexico’s;  and  (iii)  had  the  same 
export/GNP ratio  as  Mexico.  In  the  construction  of  these  counterfactual 
DSRs,  we  assume that  the  total  debt of  Indonesia  remained  unchanged  in 
these alternative scenarios. 
Item (i) in part A of table 8.4 reports the DSRs normalized by  the actual 
export level  after the  IGGI  effect  and the  prudence  factor were  removed. 
Item (ii) normalizes  the different debt services by the level of exports that 
would  have  come  about  if  Indonesia  had  the  same export/GNP ratio  as 
Mexico. The last entry  in  item  (ii) reports that  if  the  Indonesian  debt and 
economy  assumed  all  three  Mexican  features,  the  resultant  DSRs  in 
1980-82  would be two to three times larger than the actual, making a debt 
crisis highly probable. On average, Indonesia’s DSR would be 54 percentage 
points higher if  it had all three Mexican features. 
Part B of table 8.4 reports the range of values assumed by each factor in 
six  decompositions  of  their effect, along  with  the  average  contribution  of 
each factor.  We  use  average contribution  in  our discussion  because  theory 
gives us no guidance as to which decomposition  is most natural. The results 
show that the export orientation  of  Indonesia is the most decisive factor in 
why  Indonesia’s total  DSR  is  so  low  compared  with  Mexico’s.  Export 
orientation explains 3 1 of the 54 percentage point difference, accounting for 
57 percent  of  the  gap.  The prudence  factor was of  moderate importance, 
contributing 18 percentage points and thus accounting for almost one-third of 
the  gap. Concessional  interest  rates  and the  currency composition of  debt 
played  only  a  minor  role  in  reducing  the  DSR,  explaining  less  than  6 
percentage points. 
Our finding that the IGGI effect contributed so little toward the reduction 
of  the  1980-82  debt-serviceiexport  ratio is surprising  because many of the 137  IndonesidChapter 8 
~ 
Table 8.4  Relative Importance of IGGI, Maturity Structure, and Export Orientation 
Part A: Construction of  counterfactual ratios for decomposition 
1980  1981  1982  Avg  (80-82) 
-  -  - 
(i) Total debt-service normalized by  actual exports 
Actual maturity structure 
At actual interest rates  25.1 
At  Mexican interest rates  31.1 
At actual interest rat-  37.1 
At Mexican interest rates  42.0 
Mexican maturity structure 
(ii) Total debt-service normalized by  counterfactual 
Actual maturity structure 
At  actual interest rates  54.6 
At  Mexican interest rates  67.6 
At actual interest rates  80.5 
At Mexican interest rates  91.3 


















Part B:  Relative importance as determined by  average of  the six possible decompositions 
Hypothetical 1980-82  average ratio when Indonesia has all three Mexican features is 84.4 percent 
Actual  1980-82  average ratio is 30.1 percent. 
Percent of  Gap Between 
Actual and Counterfactual 
Range of  Values 
Assumed in the Six 
Average Value  Ratios Accounted For  Decompositions 
IGGI concessional loans  5.8 
Maturity structure due 
to Pertamina legacy and 
absence of  capital flight  17.7 















informed  observers  we  talked  to cited  foreign concessionary  loans  as the 
primary reason for the absence of an Indonesian debt crisis. Our point is that 
while the $1  billion  saved annually in reduced debt service during  1980-82 
is a large sum of  money,5 this amount would have been easily swamped by a 
Mexico-style loss of  reserves if the Indonesian government had tried to prop 
up an overvalued exchange rate and was then forced to finance capital flight. 
Similarly,  if  exports  were  12  percent  below  actual  value  because  of  an 
overvalued exchange rate, as suggested by the  1965-68  experience, the loss 
in foreign reserves would have also greatly exceeded this  $1  billion  saving. 
Our conclusion  is that the Indonesian exchange rate policy was the most 
important  reason  Indonesia  was  able to meet  its debt commitments in  the 
1982-84  period.  The conduct  of  this  exchange  rate  policy  was  greatly 
facilitated by the existence of a political lobby which promotes exchange rate 
protection  and  by  the  memory  of  the  economy-wide  negative  effects of 
exchange rate overvaluation. The fact that neither the budget deficits nor the 
money growth  rates went out of their historical  range for extended periods 
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8.5  Prospects 
Since over 30 percent of  Indonesia’s public debt is denominated in yen, 
debt-service payments have jumped in the face of the 68 percent appreciation 
of  the  yen  against  the  dollar  in  the  1985:lQ  to  1987:lQ  period.  Debt 
management has become more difficult since 1984. Agricultural commodity 
prices and oil prices have continued to decline, often very rapidly. The price 
of  oil plunged  from $28/barrel to $lO/barrel between January and August 
1986. The fall in export earnings from $21 billion in  1982 to $15 billion in 
1986 has caused the total debt-servicelexport ratio to soar to 68 percent. The 
situation is ominous. 
While  our  analysis  would  place  the  greatest  of  emphasis  upon  an 
aggressive competitive real  exchange policy to reduce the probability of  a 
debt crisis through its effects on exports and capital flight, we strongly feel 
that  there  are  a  number  of  other  policies  which  must  be  implemented 
immediately  if  a  debt  crisis  is  to  be  avoided  in  the  medium  run.  The 
supplementary  policies  which  we  recommend  can  be  divided  into  two 
groups: (1) those which affect the debt service directly, and (2) those which 
affect export earnings. 
The  policy  measures  which  would  ameliorate the  debt  service burden 
directly, through the reduction of  foreign borrowing, are: 
1. Cut  budget  deficits by  controlling spending and  increasing taxes.  The 
fiscal policy posture must be  kept consistent with that  of  the exchange 
rate. The tax reforms since January  1984 have raised domestic revenue 
considerably, but their implementation has not been wholly satisfactory. 
While  the  number  of  registered taxpayers has  increased from 550,000 
before the tax reform to 995,000 at the end of  1985, only 50 percent of 
the companies and 70 percent of  registered taxpayers actually filed tax 
returns in  1985 (World Bank  1986, 13). The elimination of this slack in 
tax  collection should  not  cost  too  much  given  that  the  offenders  are 
already known. The task now is to fully enforce existing tax laws. 
2.  Maintain an anti-inflationary stance in  monetary policy. This would help 
to keep  trade  account deficits down  by  reducing absorption relative to 
income.  Interest  rates  should  be  kept  internationally  competitive  to 
discourage capital flows. Both of  these outcomes would make exchange 
rate management easier. 
3. Amend  the  “balanced”  budget  rule  to  allow  internal  financing  of 
government deficits. This rule was introduced to prevent the reoccurrence 
of the kind of  inflation in 1961-65  that resulted from the monetization of 
the budget deficits. It may seem imprudent to remove this institutional- 
ized practice but the fact is that the inflation of  the final Soekarno years 
was  the  result  of  the  breakdown  of  the  political  system  which  made 
austerity policies impossible. And  if  political conditions were to really 
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anyway. Furthermore, at present, while this rule prevents monetization of 
budgetary expenditure, it does not prevent the monetization of nonbud- 
getary  expenditure,  e.g., central  bank  credits  to  BULOG.  Since bold 
austerity  policies  during  bad  times  have  never  been  avoided  by  the 
Soeharto regime, it makes little sense not to amend the balanced budget 
practice in  order to reduce reliance on external funds.  In  addition,  the 
development of  a domestic market in government securities would make 
open market operations by  the central bank  possible.  The existence of 
this monetary tool would enhance monetary control, and thus macroeco- 
nomic stabilization efforts, tremendously. 
4.  Accelerate the development of  the domestic financial system.  Besides 
further deregulation of the financial sector, financial deepening could be 
boosted by  the privatization of  many of  the state-owned enterprises. The 
balance-of-payments position would be improved if  the government were 
to allow foreigners to purchase shares in the former state enterprises. A 
developed  financial  market  would  lower  intermediation  costs,  allow 
better monetary control, and, possibly, encourage savings. 
5. Liberalize the controls on foreign investments in the manufacturing and 
agricultural sector, especially in industries that produce primarily for the 
export markets. This step will increase capital formation without the need 
of  incurring  external  debt  and  will  also  increase  foreign  exchange 
earnings.  In  short,  state  and  private  enterprises  should  issue  equities 
instead  of  bonds  to  foreign  investors  when  financing  their  capital 
expenditure. It  is important that protection not  be  used as  a means  of 
inducing foreign  investments because,  in  all  likelihood,  the  resulting 
enterprise would be inefficient and cause a net loss of  foreign exchange 
for Indonesia. 
Our proposal for liberalizing foreign investment laws may be a hard one to 
accept given the prevailing economic nationalism in Indonesia, but it should 
be seriously considered if  the debt situation takes another turn for the worse. 
The second group of supplementary external debt management policies are 
those which focus on the denominator of the DSR. Our analyses suggest that 
the viability and expansion of the Indonesian export sector depends crucially 
on : 
1. The  elimination of  the  wide  array  of  monopoly  import  licenses.  The 
present efforts to replace import licenses with tariffs is an improvement 
but it is still a second-best solution. It is important that tariffs not take the 
place of the import licenses removed from the imported basic inputs. The 
growth  of  manufactured  exports,  spurred by  access to cheaper inputs, 
will not only increase foreign exchange earnings but will  also diversify 
the export bundle, hence reducing the sensitivity of the DSR to the prices 
of a few key commodity exports. Furthermore, any Indonesian manufac- 
tured export industry that is internationally competitive will be one which 
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production  process.  The favorable employment  effects  alone  should  be 
justification enough to eliminate these monopoly import licenses. 
2.  The expansion of  the tree crop sector. Indonesia has cheaper  labor than 
Malaysia,  and  with  additional  investments  in  transportation,  Indonesia 
could potentially  outcompete  Malaysia  in  the  production  of  rubber  and 
palm oil. In addition to earning  more foreign exchange, the  strategy of 
accelerating the growth of agricultural export industries will also promote 
a more equitable rural-urban,  as well as inter-island,  growth pattern  and 
ease population pressure on the urban areas. 
A final cautionary  word  on external debt management  from the political 
perspective is pertinent.  The Pertamina crisis has led to close supervision by 
the  Ministry  of  Finance  of  external  borrowing  by  all  state  enterprises, 
making  it  unlikely  that  a  debt  crisis  would  ever  again  emerge from  the 
external adventurism of an economic fiefdom. The danger now  may be the 
absorption  of  private  external  debts in  order to  save  large  domestic  firms 
when  they  get  into financial  problems,  as in  the  Indocement  case. As  we 
described  in  chapter  3,  in  July  1985  Indocement,  the  biggest  cement 
company in Indonesia, began to experience cash flow problems because the 
recession-induced  collapse of the construction industry led to a cement glut. 
The response of the Indonesian government was to inject U.S. $325 million 
in  cash  to  acquire  a  35  percent  share  of  the  company,  and  to  form  a 
consortium  of  four  state banks  to  “convert  into  a  rupiah  liability  a U.S. 
$120 million syndicated loan that Indocement took out in  1981.’16 
If  a  few  more  such  rescues  are  allowed,  then  the  habit  may  well  be 
impossible  to  break  without  the  government  having  to  put  to  the  test  an 
important source of its political power-the  cohesiveness of the bureaucratic 
and  military  elite.  Given  the  widespread  participation  in  large  private 
business  ventures  by  government  officials  and  their  family  members,  the 
selective use of financial rescue will threaten the political unity of the group. 
If  such  political  pressure  were  able  to  completely  eradicate  the  already 
blurred  line  between  public  and  large  private  enterprises,  then  the 
vulnerability  of  Indonesia  to  a  debt  crisis  would  be  greatly  increased. 
External debt management would become impossible because no one would 
know what the size of the sovereign debt really was, and the size of this debt 
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